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ABSTRACT
The Post Conviction Relief Act1 ("PCRA"or "the Act") establishes a procedure
for defendants to collaterally challenge their conviction or sentence. It is the sole
means2 of obtaining state relief following conviction and sentencing. The PCRA
has been broadly interpreted3 as creating a unified statutory framework for re-
viewing claims that were traditionally cognizable in state habeas corpus.4 The
Act permits defendants in custody5 to seek relief when the conviction or sentence
results in one or more of the Act's enumerated errors or defectS 6 and the claimed
* William Trickett Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, Penn State Dickinson Law, and the author of
the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Act-Practice and Procedure (PBI Press, 2018 Ed).
1. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9541 et seq.
2. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9542.
3. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Chester, 733 A.2d 1242 (Pa. 1999), reargument denied, habeas corpus granted in
part 159 F.Supp.2d 58; Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth ex rel. Dadario v.
Goldburg, 773 A.2d 126 (Pa. 2001).
4. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §6501 et seq.
5. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9543(a)(1). The Act requires the defendant to be in custody at the time the petition is
filed and "at the time relief is granted." In Commonwealth v. Turner, 80 A.3d 754 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied 134
S.Ct. 1771, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the requirement that a defendant seeking
relief under the PCRA must be in custody both at the time the petition is filed and when relief is granted.
The Court noted that by limiting collateral relief to those serving sentences of confinement, the legisla-
ture simply chose not to provide a collateral review process for defendants who have completed their
sentence. Due process, the Court said, does not require a state to provide unlimited opportunities for col-
lateral relief of constitutional claims.The Court went on to reject the use of habeas corpus or coram nobis
where the defendant's sentence was completed during the time the PCRA petition was pending.
6. 42 Pa.C.S. §9543(a)(2). To avoid a bifurcated system of post-conviction relief, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has not limited the PCRA to its specifically enumerated areas of review. See e.g., Com-
monwealth v. Liebel, 825 A.2d 630 (Pa. 2003) (Act applies to claim that counsel failed to file a petition for
allowance of appeal).
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error has not been waived7 or previously litigated8 on direct appeal or in a pre-
vious PCRA petition. Subject to several narrow exceptions, a petition under the
Act must be filed within one year of the date that the defendant's judgment of
sentence becomes final.9 This article reports on a number of recent decisions of
the Pennsylvania Supreme and Superior Courts construing provisions of the Act.
THE PORA AND CORAM NOBIS
The PCRA specifically provides that it is the "sole means of obtaining collateral
relief"' 0 and it "encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies"" includ-
ing habeas corpus and coram nobis.12 Common law remedies continue to exist only
in cases where a claim is not cognizable under the Act. 13 If the claim is cognizable,
a defendant "may only obtain relief under the PCRA."13
In Commonwealth v. Descardes,15 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court considered whether a defendant who Where a claim
is no longer in custody can seek post-conviction relief i cognizable
by writ of coram nobis. Descardes, a resident alien, pled
guilty to a number of offenses and, after completing a under PCRA,
term of probation, left the country. When he attempted the PCRA is the
to return, immigration officials denied him re-entry on
the basis of his felony convictions. After seeking to only method
withdraw his guilty plea, Descardes filed a petition for of obtaining
writ of error coram nobis alleging plea counsel was in-
effective for failing to advise him he would be deported collateral review.
as a consequence of his plea. The trial court treated his
petition as one filed under the PCRA and dismissed it as untimely. Following the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky,16 Descardes filed
a second petition for a writ of coram nobis. While the trial court again treated the pe-
tition as having been filed under the PCRA, it nonetheless ordered Descardes' guilty
plea withdrawn, finding that deportation was a sentence under the PCRA.
The Superior Court, in an en banc opinion,' 7 reversed the decision of the trial
court. The court determined that the trial court erred in treating Descardes' petition
for relief as a PCRA petition, and because he no longer was in custody, he was not
eligible for PCRA relief. However, the court concluded that coram nobis "provides a
7. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9543(a)(4), 9544(b).
8. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9544(a).
9. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9545(b).
10. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9542.
11. Id.
12. Coram nobis is generally available to challenge the validity of a judgment based on "facts not before
the court when the judgment was entered." Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 285 A.2d 465,467 (Pa. 1971). Sheehan
was decided before the enactment of the PCRA. Unlike habeas corpus, coram nobis relief is not restricted
to defendants in custody. Sheehan, 285 A.2d at 468.
13. See e.g., Commonwealth v. West, 938 A.2d 1034, 1043 (Pa. 2007) (substantive due process challenge to
validity of recommitting the defendant to prison after he had been mistakenly set free not within ambit
of the PCRA); Commonwealth v. Judge, 916 A.2d 511 (Pa. 2007), cert. denied 552 U.S. 1011 (2007) (alleged
violation of defendant's rights under the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights not a cog-
nizable PCRA claim).
14. Commonwealth v. Pagan, 864 A.2d 1231, 1233 (Pa. Super. 2004).
15. Commonwealth v. Descardes, 136 A.3d 493 (Pa. 2016).
16. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (where deportation consequences of a guilty plea are "truly
clear,"counsel must inform his non-citizen client that a guilty plea will make him eligible for deportation.
17. Commonwealth v. Descardes, 101 A.3d 105 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc). Appeal granted in part 631 Pa. 445
(2015).
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way to collaterally attack a criminal conviction" for a person who has completed his
sentence. The court held that because Descardes "continues to suffer the serious
consequences of deportation,"the trial court should have treated his petition as one
seeking "coram nobis relief." However, the court concluded that Descardes was not
entitled to coram nobis relief in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Chaidez v. United States.18 In Chaidez, the Court held that Padilla announced a new
rule of constitutional law that was not applicable to defendants whose convictions
became final before Padilla was decided. 19
The Supreme Court granted the Commonwealth's petition for allowance of appeal20
on the issue of whether the Superior Court's decision conflicted with the Supreme
Court's holdings in Commonwealth v. Ahlborn21 and Commonwealth v. Hall.22 In re-
versing the Superior Court, the Court noted that Descardes' claim of ineffectiveness
of counsel was cognizable under the PCRA and that both Ahlborn and Hall had
established that where a claim is cognizable under the PCRA, the "PCRA is the only
method of obtaining collateral review." 23 The fact that there was no legal support24
for Descardes' ineffectiveness of counsel claim until after the time period for filing
a PCRA petition had expired did "not remove the claim itself from the purview of
the PCRA." 25 The Court concluded that Descardes' petition alleging ineffectiveness
of counsel should have been dismissed because he was no longer in custody at the
time it was filed. Because Descardes was ineligible for PCRA relief, neither the
PCRA court nor the Superior Court had jurisdiction to consider Descardes' petition.
MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES
In Alleyne v. United States,2 6 the United States Supreme Court considered whether
its decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey27 applied to mandatory minimum sentences. In
18. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 1103 (2013).
19. In a concurring and dissenting opinion in Descardes, Judge Bowes argued that the majority erred in
concluding that the defendant properly invoked coram nobis to obtain review of his untimely ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. In Judge Bowes' view, defendant's ineffectiveness claim was cognizable un-
der the PCRA, and, as such, the defendant was foreclosed from seeking relief by means of a common law
writ even though he could not obtain PCRA relief because he was no longer in custody.
20. Despite the fact that the Commonwealth had prevailed in the Superior Court, the Supreme Court
concluded that review was appropriate because the Superior Court's published decision recognized a
right to collateral review of a particular ineffectiveness of counsel claim independent of the PCRA and
because the Superior Court had issued decisions based upon its en banc decision in the case.
21. Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 699 A.2d 718 (Pa. 1999). In Ahlborn, the defendant's PCRA petition was
dismissed after he completed his sentence before his scheduled PCRA hearing. On appeal, the Supreme
Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition. The Court noted that unlike the prior Post-Conviction
Hearing Act which permitted petitioners no longer in custody but who faced civil or criminal conse-
quences as a result of their conviction to obtain review by means of coram nobis, the PCRA "contains
express language which prevents a petition filed under the PCRA from being treated as a request for
relief under the common law."Id. at 721.
22. Commonwealth v. Hall, 771 A.2d 1232 (Pa. 2001). In Hall, the defendant filed an untimely petition
claiming counsel was ineffective in failing to file a direct appeal. The PCRA court dismissed the petition
as untimely but allowed the defendant to file a petition for appeal nunc pro tunc outside the framework
of the PCRA. In reversing the Superior Court which had upheld the decision of the PCRA court, the
Supreme Court noted that the legislature clearly required that claims that could be brought under the
PCRA "must be brought under that Act."Id. at 1235 (emphasis in original). Because the defendant's claim
of ineffectiveness of counsel was within the framework of the PCRA, the "PCRA was the sole means by
which he could seek relief." Descardes, 136 A.3d at 499.
23. Descardes, 136 A.3d at 501.
24. The prevailing law at the time Descardes' initial petition was filed was Commonwealth v. Frometa,
555 A.2d 92 (Pa. 1989). In Frometa, the Court had held that counsel was not ineffective for failing to warn
a defendant of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea, including deportation.
25. Descardes, 136 A.3d at 502.
26. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013).
27. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000).
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Apprendi, the Court held that other than a prior conviction, any fact that increases
"the penalty for the crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum" 28 must be
found by the factfinder beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant at
his guilty plea.29 In Alleyne, the Court applied Apprendi and held that a defendant
has a constitutional right to have a jury decide whether a fact that leads to the im-
position of a mandatory minimum sentence has been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.3 0 In numerous decisions post-Alleyne, Pennsylvania courts have held that
most of Pennsylvania's mandatory minimum sentencing statutes are unconstitu-
tional because the statutes permit the trial court to increase the defendant's mini-
mum sentence based upon a preponderance of the evidence.31
The question of whether a defendant who had received a mandatory minimum
sentence and filed a timely petition could obtain post-conviction relief following
Alleyne was decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v.
Washington.32 In Washington, the Court stated that when new constitutional rules
such as Alleyne are announced, they generally apply only to future cases and cases
pending on direct appeal. New rules, the Court noted, do not "automatically render
final, pre-existing sentences illegal."A sentence is illegal only if the new rule applies
retroactively. In determining whether Alleyne applies retroactively to cases on col-
lateral review, the Court used the framework established by the United States
Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane.33 In Teague, the Court recognized two exceptions
to the general rule that new rules do not apply to cases on collateral review. The first
exception is a new substantive rule that forbids "criminal punishment of certain pri-
mary conduct" or prohibits "a certain category of punishment for a class of defen-
dants."34 The second exception is "watershed rules of criminal procedure: ... those
new procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously
diminished."35 The Court in Washington concluded that Alleyne is not a substantive
rule because it "neither alters the range of conduct or persons punished by the law."
Nor is Alleyne a "groundbreaking," watershed procedural rule as it remains"lawful
and ... routine"under discretionary sentencing for judges to increase sentences. As
a result, the Court concluded that Alleyne does not apply "retroactively to cases
pending on collateral review. .. "
28. Id. at 2362-3.
29. In Blakely v. Washington, 524 U.S. 296 (2004) rehearing denied 542 U.S. 961 (2004), the Court held that
the statutory maximum for purposes of Apprendi is the "maximum sentence a judge may impose solely
on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."
30. In Alleyne, the Court held that the elements of a crime include"not only facts that increase the ceil-
ing but also those that increase the "floor" of the punishment to which the defendant may be subjected.
Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2154. Alleyne expressly overruled Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002) in which
the Court held that a mandatory minimum sentence did not result in a sentence that exceeded the statu-
tory maximum.
31. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86, 98 (Pa. Super. 2014 (en banc), appeal denied, 632 Pa. 86
(2015).
32. Commonwealth v. Washington, 142 A.3d 810 (Pa. 2016).
33. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). The Court declined to recognize an independent, state level
retroactivity analysis under Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008). In Danforth, the United States
Supreme Court held that state courts are not bound by Teague and may choose the standard for deciding
whether new rules of federal constitutional procedure are applicable to defendants seeking collateral re-
view. The Court in Washington noted that Teague seeks to balance fairness and finality and "unless and
until developed arguments are advanced which persuade [the] Court that a better equilibrium can be
achieved, the Teague construct shall remain the default approach in Pennsylvania. . . ." Washington, 142
A.3d at 819.
34. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989).
35. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 313. In Teague, the Court noted that the "watershed rule" exception was
"extremely narrow" and the Court thought it unlikely that any such rules "have yet to emerge."
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The Superior Court has addressed Alleyne in several post-Washington cases. In
Commonwealth v. Rivera,36 the defendant filed a timely PCRA petition following a
negotiated guilty plea. He claimed counsel was ineffective for advising him post-
Alleyne3 7 to plead to an unlawful mandatory minimum sentence 38 and for failing to
file a requested direct appeal. The PCRA court concluded that counsel was not in-
effective because the law at the time of his plea permitted Rivera to plead to an
offense involving a mandatory minimum sentence.3 9 Counsel, therefore, had a rea-
sonable basis for advising Rivera to accept the plea offered. The PCRA court also
found that Rivera failed to establish that he had requested counsel to file a direct
appeal. Nonetheless, the PCRA court concluded Rivera was entitled to relief be-
cause counsel failed to "consult sua sponte" with Rivera with respect to whether he
wished to file a direct appeal "regarding the constitutionality of his plea under
Alleyne. . . ." Accordingly, the PCRA court reinstated the defendant's post-sentence
and direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc. On appeal, the Commonwealth claimed that
Rivera had agreed to a negotiated guilty plea and that counsel did not have a duty
to consult with Rivera regarding direct appeal because he had received the sentence
he had bargained for.
In affirming the grant of PCRA relief, the Superior Court held that Rivera could,
at the time he pled guilty, agree to the imposition of a mandatory minimum sen-
tence. Nonetheless, counsel had a duty under Roe v. Flores-Ortega40 to consult with
Rivera because Alleyne presented a non-frivolous ground for an appeal. In the
court's view, a legitimate argument could have been made at the time Rivera was
sentenced that Alleyne precluded a mandatory sentence even in the context of a plea
bargain. Rivera did not make a"knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver" 41 of his
right to direct appeal because counsel did not explain to him the potential illegality
of his sentence 2 As such, counsel was ineffective for failing to provide Rivera with
"all the relevant information" he needed to decide whether to file a direct appeal.43
In Commonwealth v. Ciccone,44 the defendant was sentenced under a mandatory
minimum sentencing statute 45 and subsequently sought PCRA relief. He claimed
his sentence was illegal under Alleyne and that he was entitled to relief because the
claim was cognizable under the PCRA and presented in a timely petition. The PCRA
court denied relief and on appeal, the Superior Court affirmed in an en banc deci-
sion. The court noted that it had issued a number of decisions under Alleyne on di-
36. Commonwealth v. Rivera, 154 A.3d 370 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal denied 169 A.3d 1072 (2017).
37. Alleyne was decided seven months before Rivera entered his guilty plea
38. 18 Pa.C.S.A. §7508 (a)(7)(i) (mandatory minimum sentence of three years' imprisonment for PWID
of at least one, but less than five, grams of heroin and prior drug trafficking conviction).
39. The PCRA court stated that at the time of Rivera's plea and during the period he could seek direct
appeal, no appellate court had declared 18 Pa.C.S.A. §7508 unconstitutional.
40. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000).
41. Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564, 572 (Pa. 1999).
42. The Commonwealth claimed that instead of seeking access to direct appeal, Rivera could obtain
the relief he desired by seeking post-conviction relief. The court disagreed stating that Rivera's right to
PCRA relief was "far from a foregone conclusion."The court noted that the state of the law with respect
to Alleyne claims was "in flux," citing the Supreme Court's decision in Washington and the Superior
Court's earlier decision in Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 131 A.3d 54, 59-60 (Pa. Super. 2015) (invalidating sen-
tence on collateral review, holding Alleyne was not being applied retroactively because sentence in case
was not final when Alleyne was decided).
43. In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Judge Bowes argued that the record established that coun-
sel was completely unaware of the Alleyne decision and therefore, counsel was ineffective during the ne-
gotiation of Rivera's guilty plea.
44. Commonwealth v. Ciccone, 152 A.3d 1004 (Pa. Super. 2016).
45. 18 Pa.C.S.A. §7508(a)(1)(ii).
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rect appeal striking down mandatory minimum statutes including the mandatory
minimum sentence under which Ciccone had been sentenced. 46 The court held that
Ciccone's sentence was not illegal because under Commonwealth v. Washington,
Alleyne is not retroactive and, therefore, does not apply to claims for relief under the
PCRA. The court also rejected Ciccone's claim that a statute rendered illegal by
Alleyne is void ab initio rendering any sentence imposed pursuant to the statute
invalid. In the court's view, a Pennsylvania mandatory minimum statute cannot
be considered unconstitutionally void ab initio because the United States Supreme
Court initially upheld the constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentencing
statutes in McMillan v. Pennsylvania.47 The court concluded that Ciccone's sentence
was based upon United States Supreme Court precedent, and, therefore, the sen-
tence was not illegal when imposed.48
In Commonwealth v. Patterson,49 the Superior Court considered the validity of an
open guilty plea that was entered shortly before Alleyne was decided. The plea was
entered with the understanding that the Commonwealth would seek a five-year
mandatory minimum sentence.5 0 At the sentencing hearing several months later,
the Commonwealth waived its right to seek the mandatory sentence and agreed to
a term of incarceration of 4-8 years. There was no reference at the sentencing hear-
ing to Alleyne, nor was there any indication that Patterson was aware of the decision.
Patterson subsequently filed a PCRA petition claiming plea counsel was ineffective
in failing to advise him of the Alleyne decision. 51 The PCRA court dismissed the pe-
tition without an evidentiary hearing on the basis that counsel cannot be deemed
ineffective for failing to anticipate changes in the law.52
On appeal, Patterson argued that the threat of receiving a mandatory minimum
sentence induced him to plead guilty. In addition, Patterson sought a remand to
address whether plea counsel was ineffective in failing either to challenge the ne-
gotiated sentence or to file a motion to withdraw his plea in light of Alleyne.
In reversing and remanding the case, the Superior Court stated that it was rea-
sonable to infer from Patterson's averments in his amended PCRA petition that he
would not have accepted the Commonwealth's offer of sentence and, in fact, would
have withdrawn his plea, had he known that he would not be subject to a mandatory
minimum sentence. The court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to de-
termine whether counsel did, in fact, fail to advise Patterson about the application
of Alleyne.53
INEFFECTIVENESS AND ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
In two recent cases involving allegations of ineffectiveness of counsel, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court considered the issue of waiver of the attorney-client privi-
46. Commonwealth v. Mosley, 114 A3d 1072 (Pa. Super. 2015).
47. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
48. In a dissenting opinion, President Judge Emeritus Bender argued that Ciccone was entitled to relief
because the PCRA provides relief from any illegal sentence, provided the issue is raised, as here, in a
timely petition.
49. Commonwealth v. Patterson, 143 A.3d 394 (Pa. Super. 2016).
50. 35 P.S. §780-113(a)(30) (possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) with intent to deliver).
51. Patterson also claimed that the mandatory sentences sought by the Commonwealth induced him
to agree to the sentence imposed.
52. See e.g,. Commonwealth v. Bennett, 57 A.3d 1185, 1201 (Pa. 2012).
53. The court noted that Patterson would be entitled to a new sentencing hearing if he established that
as a result of counsel's failure to advise him of Alleyne, he agreed to the negotiated sentence only under
the undue influence of the unconstitutional mandatory minimum sentence. An additional showing that
Patterson would have withdrawn his guilty altogether had counsel properly advised him of Alleyne would
entitle Patterson to withdraw his guilty plea.
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lege.5 4 Section 9545(d)(3) of the Act provides that when relief is based on a claim of
ineffectiveness, "any privilege concerning counsel's representation as to that issue
shall be automatically terminated."5 5 In Commonwealth v. Flor,56 a capital case, the
Commonwealth moved for the production of trial counsel's complete records of
Flor's conviction and sentence in response to Flor's PCRA claims of ineffective as-
sistance of counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court granted the
Commonwealth's discovery motion and denied PCRA counsel's request to review
trial counsel's file to identify and remove any privileged materials. In support of its
broad discovery order,5 7 the PCRA court relied upon the fact that Flor had pled
guilty and that by alleging trial counsel was ineffective, Flor waived any entitlement
to rely upon the attorney-client privilege or work product protection. Flor filed an
appeal from the discovery order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313.58
In concluding that the PCRA court abused its discretion in permitting "whole-
sale" discovery, the Supreme Court held that the PCRA court had failed to conduct
an issue-specific waiver analysis to determine the extent to which Flor's claims "de-
pended upon otherwise privileged material. . . ." The Court noted that the volumi-
nous file which the PCRA court's broad order compelled to be disclosed contained
privileged documents because it included direct appeal material and material un-
related to the issues raised in the PCRA petition. The PCRA court did not conduct
an in camera review nor allow PCRA counsel"the opportunity to separate the mate-
rial that remained privileged from that which was put in issue by Flor's claims."The
Court stated that the "mere potential" that the discovery order will force disclosure
of privileged material was a sufficient reason to reverse the discovery order. In ad-
dition, the Court noted that disclosure of the entirety of trial counsel's file without
54. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §5916 provides that "[i]n a criminal proceeding counsel shall not be competent or per-
mitted to testify to confidential communications made to him by his client, nor shall the client be com-
pelled to disclose the same, unless in either case the privilege is waived upon the trial by the client." See
also Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(G).
55. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9545(d)(3). In Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 738 A.2d 406 (Pa. 1999), the defendant sought
PCRA relief alleging trial counsel was ineffective.Trial counsel revealed privileged information when he
testified in the PCRA proceeding. After the defendant was awarded a new trial, the Commonwealth in-
troduced trial counsel's post-conviction testimony. On appeal, the Court held that an "attorney may not
respond to allegations of ineffectiveness by disclosing client confidences unrelated to such allegations."
Permitting the Commonwealth to use the testimony would impose a "chilling effect upon defendants'ex-
ercise of their right to effective assistance of counsel." Chmiel, 738 A.2d at 423.
56. Commonwealth v. Flor, 136 A.3d 150 (Pa. 2016).
57. Discovery in PCRA proceedings is governed by Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(E)(2) which provides that, upon a
first counseled petition in a death penalty case, no discovery is permitted "except upon leave of court af-
ter a showing of good cause."In non-capital cases, no discovery is permitted "except upon leave of court
after a showing of exceptional circumstances." Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(E)(1).
58. In Commonwealth v. Harris, 32 A.3d 243 (Pa. 2011), the Supreme Court held that discovery orders re-
jecting claims of privilege and requiring disclosure constitute collateral orders are immediately appeal-
able under Pa.R.A.P. 313. In Harris, a capital case, the defendant claimed trial counsel was ineffective re-
garding the presentation of a psychologist during the penalty portion of his trial. Harrris claimed trial
counsel was aware that the psychologist's evaluation was deficient because he had not tested Harris for
organic brain damage. He also claimed that the psychologist had not performed appropriate testing even
though he was aware that Harris's mental history suggested a cognitive disorder. In response, the
Commonwealth sought a declaration from the PCRA court that the defendant had waived his psycholo-
gist-patient privilege and further sought permission to hire the psychologist as its own expert for the
PCRA proceedings. After the PCRA court granted the Commonwealth's motion, the defendant appealed
pursuant to Rule 313. The Supreme Court held that although Harris had waived the privilege as to the
material necessary for the Commonwealth to respond to the ineffectiveness claim, the Commonwealth
could not retain Harris's former expert. Retaining the expert, the Court concluded, would risk "disclosure
of material to which [Harris] had not waived privilege, but would also erode public confidence in the in-
tegrity of criminal proceedings."Id. at 252.
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the required issue-specific waiver analysis would have a "chilling effect" upon a de-
fendant's ability to vindicate his right to effective representation. 59 Upon remand,
the Court directed the PCRA court "to permit PCRA counsel the opportunity to de-
termine precisely what portions of trial counsel's file remain privileged in light of
Flor's claims."
In Commonwealth v. King,60 the Court considered the question of whether the
Commonwealth has the right to interview trial counsel ex parte when the defendant
seeks PCRA relief on the basis of trial counsel's ineffectiveness. Prior to filing an
amended PCRA petition, King's appointed counsel made numerous attempts to
communicate with trial counsel with respect to various claims he intended to raise
in his amended petition. Trial counsel declined to cooperate with PCRA counsel.6 1
Thereafter, PCRA counsel advised trial counsel that as part of his continuing duty
of loyalty to King, he should not discuss his representation of King with members
of the District Attorney's office. After an amended petition was filed claiming trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a specific cautionary instruction, trial
counsel indicated he would not cooperate with PCRA counsel and, instead, referred
him to the District Attorney's office. In advance of the evidentiary hearing, PCRA
counsel wrote to trial counsel and left telephone messages asking whether he had a
strategic reason for not requesting the instruction in question. When he received no
response from trial counsel, PCRA counsel filed a motion requesting that the
District Attorney be precluded from interviewing trial counsel ex parte. In response,
the Commonwealth stated that it was standard practice to prepare for PCRA hear-
ings involving claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness to interview trial counsel in pri-
vate prior to the hearing. The PCRA court granted the requested motion and there-
after, the Commonwealth filed an immediate appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313.
In affirming the order of PCRA court, the Court rejected the Commonwealth's ar-
gument that the attorney-client privilege does not apply to its proposed out-of-
court interview with trial counsel and that King waived all privileges by claiming
trial counsel was ineffective. The Court stated that its decisions in Flor and
Commonwealth v. Harris62 establish that privileges are subject to an issue-specific
waiver in PCRA proceedings involving claims of ineffectiveness of counsel.
Privileged information that does not relate to the ineffectiveness claim "remains
fully protected." The Court stated that its prior decisions "demand" that PCRA
courts "vigilantly guard against disclosure of 'privileged materials' in out-of-court
interviews with individuals who performed work for the defense or in discovery
proceedings outside the courtroom." The Court noted that the proposed private in-
terview of trial counsel "could easily become a freewheeling inquiry into privileged
matters" and that the only way to guard against this is to preclude the Common-
wealth from interviewing trial counsel in advance of the PCRA hearing.63
59. The Court also noted that the PCRA court's reliance of the defendant's guilty plea as a basis for its
broad discovery order was error. A guilty plea waives one's right against self-incrimination with respect
to the charge but does not waive the attorney-client or work product protections.
60. Commonwealth v. King, 167 A.3d 140 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal granted 184 A.3d 946 (2018).
61. In a telephone conversation with PCRA counsel, trial counsel allegedly stated: "You're nuts if you
think I'm gonna help you."Id. at 143.
62. Supra note 58.
63. Based upon trial counsel's statements to PCRA counsel and his uncooperative attitude, the Court
found that the PCRA court's order was proper to prevent a possible breach of Pennsylvania Rules of
Professional Responsibility with respect to confidentiality of information and the duty of loyalty a lawyer
has to a former client.
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APPELLATE COUNSEL INEFFECTIVENESS AND
PRESUMED PREJUDICE
When a defendant challenges the effectiveness of trial,64 appellate,65 or PCRA
counsel,66 the general rule is that to obtain relief, the defendant must establish both
inadequate performance and prejudice.67 In United States v. Cronic,68 the United
States Supreme Court recognized that some"circumstances ... are so likely to prej-
udice the accused"69 that prejudice could be presumed, i.e., where counsel"entirely
fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing. . . ." The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has presumed prejudice where counsel ignored de-
fendant's request and failed to file a direct appeal,70 failed to file a statement of mat-
ters complained of on appeal,7 ' failed to file a requested petition for allowance of
appeal, 72 or failed to file an appellate brief.73 On the other hand, the Court has not
presumed prejudice where appellate counsel failed to include notes of testimony in
the certified record and failed to provide argument with appropriate citation to au-
thority. The Court concluded that the filing of an appellate brief "deficient in some
aspect or another, does not constitute a complete failure to function as a client's ad-
vocate so as to warrant a presumption of prejudice...."7
In Commonwealth v. Rosado,75 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether
prejudice should be presumed where counsel files an appellate brief that abandons
all preserved issues in favor of an issue that was not preserved in the trial court.
Following conviction and sentence, Rosado hired new counsel to represent him at
the post-sentencing and appellate stages of his case. New counsel filed a post-sen-
tence motion raising a sufficiency of evidence claim that was denied by the trial
64. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377 (1986) ("right to
counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel").
65. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,395 (1985) (holding that right to effective counsel extends to first appeal).
66. Commonwealth v. Albert, 561 A.2d 736, 738 (Pa. 1989) (holding that rule-based right to counsel in a
PCRA proceeding includes the "concomitant right to effective assistance of counsel" in the PCRA court
and on appeal). See also Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 720 A.2d 693, 699 (Pa. 1998) (appointment of counsel
pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 904 carries with it an "enforceable right to effective post-conviction counsel").
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has acknowledged that there is "no formal mechanism designed to
specifically capture claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness defaulted by initial-review PCRA counsel."
Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 584 (Pa. 2013). Notwithstanding the absence of a "formal mecha-
nism" to challenge the effectiveness of PCRA counsel, a defendant can assert a claim of ineffectiveness
in response to the PCRA court's notice of intention to dismiss the defendant's petition. Commonwealth v.
Pitts, 981 A.2d 875, 880, n.4 (Pa. 2009).
67. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1987), the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the federal standard of ineffectiveness set out in Strickland and
the Pennsylvania test were analogous. Under the Pierce test, a court evaluates an ineffectiveness claim un-
der a three-part performance and prejudice standard. Prongs one and two of the standard concern coun-
sel's performance. To overcome the presumed effectiveness of counsel, the defendant must establish that
the issue underlying the claim of ineffectiveness has arguable merit and that defense counsel's act or
omission was not reasonably designed to advance the interests of the defendant. Prejudice, the third
prong, is satisfied if the defendant shows "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unpro-
fessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
68. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
69. Id. at 658.
70. Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564, 571 (Pa. 1999).
71. Commonwealth v. Halley, 870 A.2d 795, 801 (Pa. 2005). In Commonwealth v. Burton, 973 A.2d 428 (Pa.
Super. 2009), the Superior Court presumed prejudice when counsel filed an untimely Pa.R.App.P 1925(b)
statement.
72. Commonwealth v. Liebel, 825 A.2d 630, 635 (Pa. 2003)
73. Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 2007).
74. Commonwealth v. Reed, 971 A.2d 1216 (Pa. 2009). In Reed, the Court noted that the issues were suf-
ficiently presented to allow the Superior Court to address the merits of Reed's arguments.
75. 150 A.3d 425 (Pa. 2016).
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court. Counsel then filed a notice of appeal to the Superior Court. In response to the
trial court's order directing counsel to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, counsel
filed a"preliminary"Rule 1925(b) statement raising three issues.76 In addition, he at-
tached a copy of his post-sentence motion to the "preliminary" statement assuming
it would preserve the sufficiency of the evidence claim for purposes of appeal.
Although the trial court granted counsel's request for additional time to submit a fi-
nal Rule 1925 (b) statement, he never filed one. The trial court considered the three
claims raised in the "preliminary" statement and issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion re-
jecting the claims. Thereafter, counsel filed a brief with the Superior Court in which
he abandoned the three claims raised in his "preliminary" statement and, instead,
raised as his sole appellate claim the unpreserved sufficiency of evidence claim. The
Superior Court noted but did not address the three issues preserved in counsel's
"preliminary" Rule 1925(b) statement. It found the sufficiency of evidence claim
waived and, as a result, summarily affirmed Rosado's conviction.7 7
Rosado later filed a PCRA petition seeking reinstatement of his right to direct
appeal nunc pro tunc. He claimed appellate counsel's actions constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel per se. The PCRA court, following an evidentiary hearing, con-
cluded that appellate counsel's actions did not amount to ineffectiveness per se and
denied relief. On appeal, the Superior Court, relying upon Commonwealth v. Reed,7 8
affirmed.79 The court held appellate counsel's actions did not "constitute a complete
failure"to function as Rosado's advocate that was sufficient to justify a presumption
of prejudice.The court concluded Rosado was not entitled to relief because he failed
to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by appellate counsel's errors.
In vacating the Superior Court's order affirming Rosado's judgment of sentence,
the Supreme Court relied upon the distinction it had made in prior decisions8 0 that
the ineffective assistance of counsel per se doctrine is limited to those cases where
counsel's errors "completely foreclose merits review." Such errors, the Court stated,
amount to a constructive denial of counsel. Errors, on the other hand, that only par-
tially foreclose appellate review81 are subject to the Strickland/Pierce framework. The
filing of a brief, as here, that raises only waived issues, "is akin to failing to file doc-
uments perfecting an appeal." In both situations, the Court noted, "counsel has for-
feited all meaningful appellate review."Because counsel's error precluded litigation
of Rosado's direct appeal, the error constituted ineffective assistance of counsel per se.
DNA TESTING
In 2002, the Legislature amended the PCRA to provide for post conviction DNA
testing.82 Section 9543.1 establishes a procedure by which a defendant in custody
may seek DNA testing by filing a motion83 with the sentencing court. The motion
76. The three issues counsel raised were (1) whether Rosado's sentence "was an abuse of discretion";
(2) whether the trial court erred in excluding certain evidence; and (3) whether a juror fraudulently con-
cealed bias during voir dire.
77. Commonwealth v. Rosado, No. 2754 EDA 2012, 2013 WL 11259105 (Pa. Super. Jul. 23, 2013) (unpub-
lished opinion).
78. Reed, supra note 74.
79. Commonwealth v. Rosado, No. 2474 EDA 2014, 2015 WL 7352584 (Pa. Super. April 17, 2015) (unpub-
lished opinion).
80. See supra footnotes 66-69.
81. The Court noted that the errors in Reed did not cause a complete "deprivation of merits review" but
instead narrowed the ambit of Reed's appeal.
82. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9543.1.
83. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9543.1(a). Commonwealth v. Weeks, 831 A.2d 1194, 1196 (Pa. Super. 2003) (request for
DNA testing should be made by motion and not in a PCRA petition).
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must specify the evidence to be tested, and the movant must acknowledge that if the
motion is granted, any data obtained from samples or test results may be entered in
law enforcement databases.8 4 In addition, the motion must assert the movant's in-
nocence of the crime for which he or she was convicted. The defendant must present
a prima facie case that the identity or participation of the perpetrator of the crime
was at issue at trial85 and that exculpatory DNA testing would establish the defen-
dant's actual innocence of the offense.86 The defendant is not required to show that
DNA testing would be favorable. The court, however, must review the motion and
trial record and make a determination as to whether "there is a reasonable proba-
bility that DNA testing would produce exculpatory evidence"87 that would establish
the defendant's actual innocence. After testing, the defendant may petition for post
conviction relief during the 60-day period following notification of the test results.
Requests for DNA tests are "separate and distinct from claims"88 arising under the
PCRA.89 Neither the PCRA's one-year time bar90 nor the right to counsel 91 apply to
a motion for DNA testing.
In In re Payne,92 the Commonwealth appealed from an order granting Payne's re-
quest for DNA testing of physical evidence, including hair evidence taken from the
crime scene of a 1981 burglary/homicide and related offenses for which Payne was
convicted in 1987. No physical evidence connected Payne to the crime. The prosecu-
tion's case rested primarily on the testimony of three witnesses 93 who each purport-
edly heard Payne make inculpatory statements about the burglary/homicide. The
witnesses claimed that Payne told them that he was accompanied by two people, but
their testimony differed as to whether Payne or one of the other persons committed
the murder. The testimony of the witnesses also differed as to the identity of Payne's
co-conspirators. In 2012, Payne filed a motion for DNA testing. He claimed that the
failure to match his DNA to the tested material would demonstrate his innocence.
He also claimed that DNA testing could lead to the identification of an unknown
person who actually killed the victim. 94 The trial court rejected Payne's claim that
absence of his DNA would demonstrate his innocence. The court noted it was en-
84. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9543.1(c)(1)(iii).
85. In Commonwealth v. Wright, 14 A.3d 798 (Pa. 2011), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a de-
fendant's confession determined to be voluntary is not a per se bar to establishing a prima facie case
demonstrating that DNA testing would establish his actual innocence.
86. In Commonwealth v. Conway, 14 A.3d 101 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 29 A.3d 795 (Pa. 2011), the
court noted that the parties and the lower court had agreed on the definition of"actual innocence"to be
applied with respect to the evaluation of the effect of new evidence. That definition, the court stated, is
the one set out by the United States Supreme Court in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,327 (1995), namely, that
the new evidence must make it "more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found [the de-
fendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 299. The Court noted that the standard requires a re-
viewing court "to make a probabilistic determination about what reasonable, properly instructed jurors
would do" if presented with the new evidence. Id. at 329 and 339.
87. Commonwealth v. Smith, 889 A.2d 582, 584 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied, 905 A.2d 500 (Pa. 2006).
88. 42 Pa. C.S. §9543.1(f)(1). Commonwealth v. Perry, 959 A.2d 932, 938 (Pa. Super, 2008).
89. Commonwealth v. Kunco, 173 A.3d 817 (Pa. Super. 2017) (concluding that Commonwealth has right to
appeal an order granting DNA testing even though PCRA proceedings remain pending).
90. Commonwealth v. Conway, 14 A.3d 101, 108 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 29 A.3d 795 (Pa. 2012);
Commonwealth v. Brooks, 875 A.2d 1141, 1146 (Pa. Super. 2005).
91. Brooks, 875 A.2d at 1147.
92. In re Payne, 129 A.3d 546 (Pa. Super. 2015).
93. Two of the witnesses were jailhouse informants who expected to receive leniency in exchange for
their testimony.
94. Payne's second argument was based on the"data bank"theory that any DNA results that prove the
presence of an unknown person"could be run through state and federal data banks for a match, which,
if successful, would lead to the identification of a separate assailant." Commonwealth v. Conway, 14 A.3d
101, 110 (Pa. Super. 2011).
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tirely possible that Payne left no DNA at the scene of the crime. As to Payne's claim
that testing would lead to the discovery of an unknown assailant, the court consid-
ered the weight of the trial evidence demonstrating guilt and concluded that a jury
might have "placed more emphasis on the weaknesses of the prosecution's case" if
there were DNA evidence introduced that did not directly tie Payne to the murder
scene. In addition, the court concluded that in light of the fact that the evidence
pointed to two other persons having been present when the crime was committed
whose identities remain unknown, DNA testing may result in additional charges of
those who participated in the crime.
On appeal, the Commonwealth claimed that the trial court erred when it found
that there was a reasonable probability that the test results could demonstrate
Payne's "actual innocence." It argued that the framework of Payne's felony murder
conviction precluded a finding of "actual innocence" because in order to convict
Payne, the jury was not required to determine whether Payne was the principal ac-
tor in the crime. In an en banc decision, the Superior Court affirmed the trial court's
order granting testing. The court initially concluded that the trial court was correct
in rejecting Payne's argument that failure to match his DNA to the tested evidence
would demonstrate his innocence. The court noted that it has consistently held that
the absence of an accused's DNA, "by itself, cannot satisfy . . ." the statute's "actual
innocence" standard.95 With respect to Payne's "data bank" argument that DNA
testing might reveal the identity of the person who actually killed the victim, the
court rejected the Commonwealth's claim that test results would not establish
Payne's "actual innocence."The court noted that Payne's conspiracy conviction had
been reversed in 1993 but even if the conspiracy conviction survived, the Common-
wealth had failed to explain how the underlying offenses of conspiracy and accom-
plice-to-burglary conviction "are immune from scrutiny given certain exculpatory
DNA results."Nor did the Commonwealth explain why DNA testing which showed
an unexplained DNA profile or profiles"would only serve to attack Payne's identity
as the actual killer, but not his identity as a co-conspirator or accomplice to the
crime of burglary."The court noted that the statute requires that the trial court as-
sume exculpatory results in ruling on a request for DNA testing. The threshold
question, the court stated, is not "the likelihood of proof of innocence, but whether
it is within the realm of reason that some result(s) could prove innocence." While
the court acknowledged that some potential DNA profiles would tend to support
the Commonwealth's case against Payne, it noted it was not "difficult to imagine"
other possible results of testing that would undermine the jury's verdict in the case.
While Payne's felony murder conviction limits the results of DNA testing that "could
assist in proving his innocence, it does not exclude them all." As a result, the trial
court's decision was supported by the evidence and free of legal error.96
In Commonwealth v. Walsh,97 Walsh was charged with aggravated assault and
other crimes arising out of an incident in which the prosecution claimed that he had
used a hammer to repeatedly strike his wife and to do damage to her vehicle. Walsh
admitted to damaging the vehicle but denied he ever struck his wife with the ham-
mer. Following his conviction in 2004 and multiple PCRAs, Walsh filed a motion in
95. See Commonwealth v. Heilman, 867 A.2d 542, 547 (Pa. Super. 2005); Commonwealth v. Smith, 889 A.2d
582, 586 (Pa. Super. 2005); Commonwealth v. Brooks, 875 A.2d 1141, 1147 (Pa. Super. 2005).
96. Judge Stabile dissented on the basis that Payne had failed to set forth a prima facie case of actual
innocence. President Judge Gantman wrote a separate dissenting opinion based on Payne's failure to es-
tablish the timeliness of his motion for DNA testing as required by 42 Pa.C.S. §9543(d)(1)(iii).
97. Commonwealth v. Walsh, 125 A.3d 1248 (Pa. Super. 2015).
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2014 requesting DNA testing to determine if his wife's blood was present on the
hammer. He claimed the absence of his wife's DNA on the hammer would establish
his actual innocence of aggravated assault. After finding Walsh had failed to estab-
lish entitlement of DNA testing, the trial court denied his motion.
In affirming the denial of DNA testing, the Superior Court concluded that Walsh
had failed to satisfy the threshold statutory requirements necessary to obtain DNA
testing.9 8 The court found that the hammer Walsh sought to have tested was avail-
able for testing before his trial, and technology was available at the time of his trial
to test the hammer. In addition, the trial court had not refused a request for funds
to test the hammer for DNA evidence. The court also concluded that Walsh had
failed to establish a prima facie case demonstrating his actual innocence because the
absence of his wife's DNA on the hammer would not establish Walsh's "actual in-
nocence for aggravated assault." Finally, the court found that Walsh's motion was
untimely99 in light of his failure to seek testing at trial and throughout the multiple
post-conviction proceedings in the case.
In Commonwealth v. Kunco,100 the Superior Court considered whether the evidence
in support of Kunco's motion for DNA testing presented a prima facie case of actual
innocence. In 1991, Kunco was convicted of rape and other sexual offenses based
upon an alleged voice identification, a sexually charged statement that a neighbor
overheard Kunco make, and a bite mark on the victim's shoulder that dental experts
claimed was made by Kunco's teeth.101 No physical evidence other than the alleged
bite mark tied Kunco to the crime scene. Although hairs were found on a blanket
and sheet, they did not match the hair color of the victim or Kunco. The hairs were
not subjected to DNA testing. In a 2009 proceeding, Kunco was excluded as a con-
tributor of the DNA found on a light cord used to torture the victim but the trial
court denied PCRA relief based upon the other evidence against Kunco, including
the bite mark evidence.
Kunco subsequently filed a second PCRA petition and a motion for DNA testing
of evidence including the blanket, clothing used to cover victim's face and the vic-
tim's rape kit. He claimed that testing of the evidence with advanced technologies
could, for the first time, detect semen and saliva, and analyze the hairs left by the as-
sailant, potentially leading to the identification of an unknown male as the contrib-
utor of the biological material. He attached to his PCRA petition affidavits of the two
odontologists who disavowed their trial testimony because the science surrounding
bite mark identification had changed significantly since their testimony in 1991. At
an evidentiary hearing, one of the odontologists testified that in light of the current
understanding of limitations of bite mark comparisons, he could not definitively say
that Kunco was responsible for the bite mark on the victim. Further, the PCRA court
heard additional expert testimony that the victim's injury "could not be definitively
categorized as a bite mark" and because the injury had healed at the time of the ex-
amination, it was not possible to do specific measurements and compare them to
Kunco's dentition. Based on this testimony, the lower court granted Kunco's request
for DNA testing.
98. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9543.1(a)(2).
99. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9543.1(d)(1)(iii).
100. Commonwealth v. Kunco, 173 A.3d 817 (Pa. Super. 2017).
101. The odontologists examined the victim five months after the attack. No visible injury existed at
the time of examination. Nonetheless, the odontologists using UV light, purported to see a bite mark and
when they placed hand drawn outlines of Kunco's teeth over the UV light photograph, they concluded
that Kunco's teeth created the bite mark impression.
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In affirming the decision of the lower court, the Superior Court noted that earlier
DNA tests had excluded Kunco as a contributor to the DNA found on the lamp cord
used in the assault. In addition, testimony in the lower court demonstrated that the
bite mark evidence was "problematic, if not entirely incredible." Because of the
questionable nature of the Commonwealth's evidence, the court concluded that it
was "more likely than not that reasonable jurors would find [Kunco] not guilty if
DNA tests" are exculpatory. Noting that a test that is favorable to a defendant does
not guarantee an acquittal, 102 the court stated that an exculpatory DNA test on one
or more of the items in question, "in tandem with the other frailties of the Common-
wealth's case, may well result in [Kunco's] acquittal."
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY AND ATTORNEYICLIENT
DECISION MAKING
In Atkins v. Virginia,03 the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the execution of intellectually disabled1 04 persons. The Court
left the determination of how to apply the prohibition to the individual states. In
Commonwealth v. Miller,05 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court set out the procedure
for the resolution of Atkins claims on collateral review.106 The Court held that the
defendant bears the burden to prove intellectual disability under accepted defini-
tions 107 by a preponderance of the evidence.
In Commonwealth v. Mason,1 08 a case of first impression, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court considered the question of whether Mason had the right to waive his Atkins
claim over the objection of counsel. In 1996, Mason was found guilty of murder and
sentenced to death. Atkins was decided while Mason's amended PCRA petition was
pending. Soon thereafter, counsel moved for immediate re-sentencing of Mason to
life imprisonment pursuant to Atkins based upon expert testimony at trial that
Mason was borderline intellectually disabled as evidenced by an overall IQ score of
71. Prior to the PCRA court's hearing on the matter, Mason sent a letter to the PCRA
judge requesting the court to disregard the Atkins motion filed by counsel. At a sub-
sequent hearing, Mason, in a prepared statement, claimed he was "absolutely not
retarded" and again stated he did not wish to pursue relief under Atkins. PCRA
counsel argued that Mason did not have a right to pro se waive the Atkins claim.
Instead, counsel claimed that the decision as to whether to pursue an Atkins claim
lies solely with appointed counsel. The PCRA court subsequently granted Mason's
request to withdraw the Atkins claim based upon the court's determination that
Mason was sufficiently competent to knowingly and intelligently waive his right to
an Atkins claim.
102. Commonwealth v. Heilman, 867 A.2d 542, 547 (Pa. Super. 2005).
103. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
104. In light of a change in terminology in the latest edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders, the term "intellectual disability" is now used to describe what was heretofore re-
ferred to as "mental retardation." See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014).
105. Commonwealth v. Miller, 888 A.2d 624 (Pa. 2005).
106. See Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 36 A.3d 24 (Pa. 2011) for the procedure for Atkins claims originating
at trial.
107. Pursuant to Miller, a defendant must establish intellectual disability using either the definition
provided by the American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(APA/DSM-IV) or the definition developed by the American Association of Mental Retardation renamed
the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Difficulties. These definitions require a de-
fendant to establish limited intellectual functioning as evidenced by an IQ score below the 65-75 range,
significant adoptive limitations and an age of onset before age 18.
108. Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601 (Pa. 2015).
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the PCRA court erred when it con-
cluded that counsel's decision to seek an Atkins hearing was subject to Mason's
veto. 109 The Court noted that the United States Supreme Court had recognized"that
the accused has the ultimate authority to make fundamental decisions"1 10 regard-
ing the exercise or waiver of four basic trial rights. With respect to these limited mat-
ters, counsel "must both consult with the defendant and obtain consent to the rec-
ommended course of action."111 As to other important decisions, the Court noted
that its jurisprudence had aligned itself with the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional
Conduct to "recognize a duty to gain the consent of the defendant with the over-
arching objective or purpose of the defense" 112 and leaves to counsel matters of
strategy and tactics in terms of achieving those objectives. In seeking PCRA relief,
the Court concluded that Mason's overarching objective was to obtain an order
vacating his death sentence. Counsel's decision to advance an Atkins claim was not
in conflict with Mason's PCRA objective. Instead, it was a strategy in support of
Mason's objective.
The Court also concluded that Mason's decision with regard to Atkins was not
comparable to the fundamental decisions subject solely to a defendant's choice.
While an intellectually disabled defendant has a fundamental, personal right to be
"insulated from capital punishment,"no determination had been made that Mason
was in fact intellectually disabled. In the Court's view, the constitutional right to
avoid capital punishment on this basis had not yet attached in his case. This fact, the
Court stated, distinguishes the issue in this case from four rights that are "clearly
vested in a defendant at the time he or she must decide whether to waive or exercise
them." 113 Moreover, simply because the decision to pursue an Atkins claim relates
to a potential constitutional right or that a decision in a criminal case "has impor-
tance and carries significant consequences" does not mean that the decision impli-
cates rights that are subject to a defendant's veto. In addition, a decision with re-
spect to Atkins requires an assessment of a number of complex legal and diagnostic
considerations, and this fact further distinguishes the Atkins hearing decision from
the fundamental rights over which a defendant has control. Finally, the Court noted
that instead of acting on Mason's pro se letter that invited hybridized representation,
the PCRA court should have simply forwarded the letter to counsel.
REMAND WITH SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS-LIMITATION ON
AMENDMENT OF PETITION
Pa.R.Crim.P. 905(A) gives the PCRA court the discretion to "grant leave to amend"
a petition for PCRA relief at any time and states that "[almendment shall be freely
allowed to achieve substantial justice." The Rule was created to allow defendants
to avoid dismissal due to a correctable defect.114 In Commonwealth v. Sepulveda,115 a
109. The Court remanded the case to the PCRA court to consider the Atkins claim. The Court noted
that, if upon remand, Mason continues to express disagreement with counsel's choice to pursue an Atkins
defense, he may seek a hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998) as to his com-
petency to represent himself.
110. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). The fundamental decisions that a defendant has ultimate
authority to determine include whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, and
to appeal. See McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 U.S. 1500 (2018).
111. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004).
112. Mason, 130 A.3d at 601 and 668.
113. Id.
114. Commonwealth v. McGill, 832 A.2d 1014, 1024 (Pa. 2003).
115. Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 144 A.3d 1270 (Pa. 2016).
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capital case, the Supreme Court considered the issue of amendment pursuant to
rule 905(A) following the case having been remanded to the PCRA court. Sepulveda
was originally denied relief in the PCRA court, and in a prior appeal, the Supreme
Court agreed with the PCRA court on all but one issue. That issue concerned
whether counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase for failing to investigate
and present evidence of Sepulveda's mental health and troubled childhood. The
Court found that the claim had arguable merit and that counsel lacked a reasonable
basis for deficient performance.116 The Court directed the PCRA court on remand to
consider the question of whether Sepulveda was prejudiced by counsel's perfor-
mance. In addition, the Court instructed the PCRA court to address an administra-
tive matter concerning whether lawyers associated with the Federal Community
Defender Office ("FCDO") "may or should lawfully represent appellant" in this
matter.117 Following remand, Sepulveda filed a pro se PCRA petition alleging newly
discovered evidence, which the court forwarded to PCRA counsel. The PCRA court
subsequently held a hearing on whether Sepulveda was prejudiced by trial coun-
sel's omissions at his penalty hearing. The court also took testimony with respect to
Sepulveda's new claims. Following the hearing, PCRA counsel sought leave to
amend Sepulveda's first, timely petition to include claims of after discovered evi-
dence, a Brady violation, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Commonwealth
objected, arguing that the court should not treat the new filing as an amended
petition, but rather as an untimely second petition. The PCRA court granted Sepul-
veda a new penalty hearing based upon the ineffectiveness of trial counsel. The
court also granted Sepulveda's motion to amend his first PCRA petition but denied
relief on the merits of the claims raised. The PCRA court believed that Rule 905 (A),
case law" 8 and the "efficient administration of justice" supported its decision to
treat Sepulveda's new claims as an amended petition. Sepulveda appealed from the
PCRA court's order dismissing his newly raised claims.
The Supreme Court concluded that the PCRA court erred in permitting
Sepulveda to amend his finally adjudicated petition. The Court held that a PCRA
court does not have discretion to consider new claims as an amended PCRA petition
following remand "unless such amendment is expressly authorized in the remand
order." Here, the PCRA court was directed to consider one claim raised by Sepul-
veda "in proceedings upon limited remand." (emphasis in original). The Court
noted that the liberal amendment policy of Rule 905(A) applies solely to petitions
pending in the PCRA court.11 9 Once the PCRA court has made a final decision on
the petition, it no longer has jurisdiction to "make any determinations related to the
petition."By permitting Sepulveda to amend"his finally decided PCRA petition,"the
PCRA court exceeded the scope the remand order and the "scope of its authority."
INEFFECTIVENESS CLAIMS, POST-SENTENCE MOTIONS, AND
INELIGIBILITY FOR PCRA REVIEW
In 2002, in Commonwealth v. Grant,120 the Supreme Court abandoned its long-
standing rule that claims of ineffectiveness of counsel must be raised by new coun-
116. Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 55 A.3d 1108, 1130 (Pa. 2012).
117. Id. at 1151.The FCDO removed the question of the propriety of their representation of Sepulveda
to federal court.
118. Commonwealth v. Flanagan, 854 A.2d 489, 495-500 (Pa. 2004) (permitting amendment raising new
claims where petition was still pending before the PCRA court).
119. The Court also noted that Rule 905(A) is limited by Pa.R.A. P. 2591 which provides that the lower
court upon remand "shall proceed in accordance with the judgment or other order of the appellate
court."
120. Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002).
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sel at the first opportunity, even if that opportunity is direct appeal and the issue
was not presented to the trial court. Grant held that, as a general rule, claims of
ineffectiveness of counsel would not be considered on direct appeal but instead
deferred to the post-conviction process. In Commonwealth v. Bomar,121 the Supreme
Court held that Grant did not apply when defendant's claims of ineffectiveness were
raised by new counsel in a post-trial motion, the trial court heard testimony of trial
counsel, and the court addressed the ineffectiveness claims in an opinion.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court expressed reservations about the use of post-
trial motions to raise claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness. In Commonwealth v.
Wright,122 the Court held that "collateral claims should not be reviewed on post-
verdict motions unless the defendant waives his right to PCRA review because the
PCRA does not afford the right to two collateral attacks."1 23
In 2013, in Commonwealth v. Holmes,124 the Supreme Court returned to the issue of
whether claims of ineffectiveness can be reviewed on post-sentence motions and
direct appeal if the defendant waives review as of right under the PCRA. In Holmes,
the Court recognized two limited discretionary exceptions to Grant's general rule of
deferral of ineffectiveness claims to the post-conviction process. The first exception
permits the trial court, in an "extraordinary case," to rule on a claim of ineffective-
ness that is both"meritorious and apparent from the record" without requiring the
defendant to waive PCRA review.1 25 The second exception permits post-sentence
review of multiple record and non-record based claims of ineffectiveness upon
"good cause shown" where there is a waiver of PCRA rights. This exception ad-
dresses the effect of Grant on defendants who receive short prison or probation sen-
tences. The Court had earlier acknowledged that the "net effect" of the Grant rule
and the statutory requirement 26 that a defendant must be "currently serving a sen-
tence of imprisonment, probation or parole" at the time collateral relief is granted
was to leave defendants with short sentences without either direct appeal or collat-
eral review to challenge trial counsel's ineffectiveness.1 27 In Holmes, the Court
specifically noted that in short sentence cases, the trial court's determination of
good cause should include the length of the sentence imposed and whether, in light
of the sentence, the defendant will be eligible for relief under the PCRA. Not ad-
dressed in Holmes was whether the exception would apply when a defendant is
statutorily ineligible for PCRA relief because he is sentenced only to pay a fine.
This issue was considered by the Court in its recent decision in Commonwealth v.
Delgros.128 Delgros was convicted of receiving stolen property and sentenced to pay
restitution and a fine. After obtaining new counsel, Delgros filed post-sentence
motions raising numerous issues including ineffectiveness of trial counsel. With
respect to the ineffectiveness claims, the trial court denied Delgros's request for an
evidentiary hearing holding he was not entitled to relief because assertions of inef-
fectiveness were collateral claims that could only be raised pursuant to the PCRA.
121. Commonwealth v. Bomar, 826 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2003).
122. Commonwealth v. Wright, 961 A.2d 119 (Pa. 2009).
123. Id. at 148, n.22. See also Commonwealth v. Liston, 977 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 2009) and Commonwealth v.
Montalvo, 986 A.2d 84 (Pa. 2009).
124. Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562 (Pa. 2013).
125. Id. at 577
126. 42 P.A.C.S.A. §9543(a)(1)(i).
127. In Commonwealth v. O'Berg, 880 A.2d 597 (Pa. 2005), the Supreme Court rejected a "short sentence"
exception to Grant. The Court noted that harm to defendants with short sentences caused by Grant "can-
not be used to defeat" the reasons underlying deferral of ineffectiveness claims to the post-conviction
process.
128. Commonwealth v. Delgros, 183 A.3d 352 (Pa. 2018).
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Delgros, the court concluded, could not pursue such relief because he was not "cur-
rently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole." The Superior
Court affirmed Delgros's judgment of sentence, rejecting his claim that he was en-
titled to relief under Holmes. The court found that the first exception to Holmes did
not apply because Delgros's ineffectiveness claims were not apparent from the
record. The court held the second Holmes exception (good cause/waiver of future
PCRA review) presumed that a defendant would subsequently be entitled to PCRA
review. Because Delgros received a sentence that made him ineligible for PCRA re-
lief, the court concluded he could not obtain review of post-sentence claims of inef-
fectiveness of counsel.
The Supreme Court held that the Superior Court erred in holding that Delgros's
inability to satisfy the custody requirement of the PCRA precluded him from ob-
taining review of this post-sentence claims of ineffectiveness of counsel. The Court
noted that in Holmes it had recognized the "bedrock" importance of effective assis-
tance of trial counsel and the importance of opportunities to challenge the effective-
ness of counsel. As a result, Holmes had created an exception to Grant that permitted
trial courts to consider ineffectiveness claims where defendants may be statutorily
prevented from seeking PCRA relief. Here, the Court noted that because Delgros
was sentenced to pay a fine, he could not obtain collateral relief. His ineligibility for
collateral relief, the Court noted, eliminates the concern the Court had in Holmes of
defendants obtaining a second opportunity to raise additional ineffectiveness
claims in a PCRA proceeding. To ensure that defendants who receive a non-custo-
dial sentence have an opportunity to challenge trial counsel's effectiveness, the
Court adopted an additional exception to Grant's general rule of deferral. The new
exception requires trial courts to address post-sentence claims of ineffectiveness of
counsel in cases where the defendant receives a sentence that statutorily precludes
PCRA relief.
CONCLUSION
Recent decisions include significant rulings on PCRA relief and the common law
writ of coram nobis, the status of mandatory minimum sentences post-Alleyne, the at-
torney-client privilege when a defendant asserts a claim of ineffectiveness of coun-
sel, the scope of the presumed prejudice doctrine, DNA testing, Atkins and attor-
ney/client decision making, and amending a petition following a remand with
specific instructions. The Supreme Court rejected the use of coram nobis by a defen-
dant who was no longer in custody and reaffirmed the principle that if a claim is
cognizable under the PCRA, the PCRA is the exclusive method of obtaining collat-
eral review. The Court concluded that the new constitutional rule announced in
Alleyne invalidating mandatory minimum sentences did not apply retroactively to
cases pending on collateral review. It also ruled that to protect the attorney-client
privilege, a PCRA court must conduct an issue-specific waiver analysis when dis-
covery is sought by the Commonwealth in response to a claim of ineffectiveness of
counsel. To guard against disclosure of privileged materials, the Commonwealth is
precluded from interviewing trial counsel in advance of the PCRA hearing. The Court
applied the principle of presumed prejudice where counsel files an appellate brief
that raises only a waived issue. In a case of first impression, the Court held a defen-
dant did not have a right to waive an Atkins hearing over the objection of counsel.
Finally, in a number of decisions concerning DNA evidence, the Superior Court con-
sidered whether the defendant had established a prima facie case of actual innocence.
